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Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense

What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? Is it in any way like observation or perception? If so, how like? In this paper I hope to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are authoritative with respect to knowledge of the contents of their own intentional states, are enough like perception to qualify as cases of quasi-observation, and so to justify the claim that authoritative self-knowledge is a form of inner observation. In doing this I am going against the current trend in philosophical literature, which is decidedly hostile to observational models of self-knowledge (Shoemaker 1994, McDowell 1994, Peacocke 1996, 1998, Wright 1998). However, I think that much of this hostility is voiced against the background of assumptions concerning the so-called observation model itself, and specifically, assumptions about what ordinary perception involves, which themselves are questionable. If the perceptual model upon which the analogy with self-knowledge is based is itself a faulty paradigm for ordinary perception, the fact that cases of self-knowledge do not conform to it is neither here nor there. One cannot establish that self-knowledge is not a form of inner observation or perception on the basis of a paradigm that is too crude or inaccurate to fit perception itself.

My strategy for making plausible the claim that certain cases of self-knowledge are, broadly speaking, observational, is to focus on various models of ordinary perception and argue that the ones that cause trouble for an observational account of self-knowledge are either unsatisfactory paradigms for ordinary perception, or, where they are not, are applicable to certain cases of self-knowledge. I shall proceed by examining two models that Sydney Shoemaker (1994) discusses extensively, the "object perception model" and the "broad perceptual model", and the reasons he

advances for thinking that introspective self-knowledge does not conform to either of these. In the case of the first, I shall argue that the core theses that Shoemaker associates with the paradigm are either dubious in their own right with regard to ordinary perception, or applicable also to certain cases of self-knowledge. In the case of the second, I shall argue that Shoemaker's claim that first-order and second-order intentional states do not, whereas perceptual states and their objects do, meet the condition of existing, or being capable of existing, *independently of one another*, is true, but that this does not show that self-knowledge is not quasi-observational. For the relevant analogy is between observable properties of objects and contentful properties of first-order intentional states in cases of perception and self-knowledge. And in neither case is the independence condition met. My overall aim is to show that there is such a variety of patterns in each case that *simple* analogies or disanalogies are unhelpful. If this is right, then the contrast between perception and introspection distorts both modes of awareness.

Before embarking on this enterprise, I should make clear what the point of the exercise is and why it is significant. The class of intentional states with which I am concerned is, in the first instance at least, a very restricted but important one. I am interested in what Tyler Burge (1985, 1988, 1996) has referred to as the *cogito*-type states; states in which one is currently consciously thinking about a thought (with a given propositional content *p*) *while* thinking that thought. Such cases of self-knowledge are thought by many to be ones where the subject is authoritative with regard to the nature and contents of the first-order thought. Suppose, for example, that it is true that I am currently, consciously thinking that I am thinking that water is transparent, and that this reflective thought constitutes knowledge. This knowledge seems to be peculiarly *immediate* or *direct* (Burge 1985, 1988, 1996, Heil 1988). Descartes (1969) thought that the special status of such knowledge that derives from this immediate relation between subject and thought, or thinker and thought reviewed, makes for a kind of *transparency* of thought reviewed to the reviewing subject. He thought that it is this difference between a subject's access to the contents of her own

intentional states and others' access to those contents that confers an epistemic advantage on the subject in the sense of better placing her to know what the contents of those states are, and so in giving her *authority* over others with regard to knowledge of such contents (see Burge 1985).

Many have understood this relation of epistemic directness as being non-evidence-based (although not baseless), which in turn encourages the view that the *cogito*-type cases are like cases of observation in certain relevant respects.¹ Specifically, the thought is that, in so far as authoritative self-knowledge depends upon epistemic immediacy, where this is non-evidence-based, a perceptual model might serve as a basis for explaining the authoritative nature of certain cases of self-knowledge.

I think that this thought is correct for the *cogito*-type cases, and elsewhere (Macdonald 1995, 1998) I have argued that there are two features of epistemic directness, of being non-evidence-based, that apply to awareness of both observable properties (primary and secondary) and sensation and intentional properties in *cogito*-type cases.² The first is that awareness of such properties is *epistemically basic* in

¹ See Heil (1988, 1992), Burge (1985, 1988), Davidson (1984, 1987, 1988), Wright (1989), and Alston (1971). Some, like Wright, emphasize the non-evidence-based character of such knowledge, whereas others, like Heil, emphasize its non-empirically evidence-based character. Alston gives an illuminating account of the different senses that might attach to the notion of direct access. He argues that the notion of directness that is relevant to self-knowledge is epistemic, not causal, and is explicable in terms of being non-evidence-based, where this is distinct from being non-inferential. Heil (1992) endorses this view.

² I take certain properties to be observable if whether objects are instances of them can be determined just by unaided observation of those objects. Whatever 'unaided' means here, it does not mean 'unconceptualized': it may be that I cannot know *which* observable property is being manifested to me through its instance simply by being presented with an instance of it, since I must be capable of recognizing another instance of that property as of that property when presented with it. For recent discussion of observable properties and observational predicates, see Wright (1987). See also Christopher Peacocke (1983) for discussion of conditions necessary and sufficient for a concept to be observational. Peacocke further elaborates the sense in which the two features I take here to be central to a property's being observable are features of observational concepts.

the sense that it is the fundamental or favoured means by which objects that instance these properties are initially typically known.³ The second is that such properties *are in general as they appear to be* when instances of them are presented to normal perceivers in normal circumstances. What makes for the peculiarly *authoritative* nature of self- knowledge is that subjects are the *only* ones to whom instances of such properties appear in the epistemically favoured way. Thus, the argument is as follows:

1. A subject S typically thinks about her own intentional states *as* states of particular contentful types and awareness of such contents is epistemically basic to S.
2. S's intentional states are of the contentful types that they appear to be (i.e., such contents are knowable by S in an epistemically direct way).
3. No one *other* than S can be the subject of S's intentional states, so that when S thinks about her own intentional states as states of particular intentional types, S is the only one to whom those contentful types appear in this way.

Therefore, in general (i.e., barring special cognitive failures)

4. S is authoritative with regard to the contents of her own intentional states.⁴

³ That is to say, typically, in getting to know what an object is, these are the first of its properties which one gets to know that it has.

⁴ This version of the argument differs from that presented in Macdonald (1995) and replicates the one presented in Macdonald (1998). What appears here as premise

If the argument is correct, self-knowledge in *cogito*-type cases is like observation or perception in being epistemically direct. Where it departs from the model of ordinary perception is in its account of what makes for *authority*. Perception, unlike certain kinds of self-knowledge, is not authoritative.⁵ But the observation model is

2 appears there as a conclusion derived from 1 and 3. The reason for the reformulation is that to see 2 as being entailed by 1 and 3 is to encourage the view that authoritative self-knowledge arises from the fact that in reflection a subject's attitude toward her first-order contentful types or properties *determines* their extensions, and so makes them the states that they are. However, unlike Wright (1988, 1992), who maintains that one's authority with respect to one's own intentional states consists in the fact that one's best opinion concerning those states' contentful types fix the extensions of those types, I maintain that one's authority consists in the fact that one cannot in reflection misidentify the object of one's reflection, and this is so because the nature of the thought reflected upon determines the nature of the reflecting thought. Reflection is, in at least one respect, an appropriate characterization of the special relation subjects' second-order thoughts bear to their first-order ones. In physical reflection, say, in a mirror, under certain ideal conditions, the object cannot be misrepresented. So the object is as it appears to be. But the reflection does not determine the object to be what it is. Similarly, in mental reflection, the nature of the thought reflected upon determines the nature of the reflection. If so, then 2 should appear as an independent premise in the argument.

⁵ So, although perception meets the conditions specified in premises 1 and 2 of the argument for authoritative self-knowledge, it does not meet the condition specified in premise 3. That premise says that first-order intentional properties are such that, when grasped in the epistemically direct way, are grasped only by their subject. But observable properties of objects, both primary and secondary, are not such that, when grasped in the epistemically direct way, are grasped only by one subject. This may make it look as though it is a contingent matter whether there is authoritative self-knowledge; a matter of who happens to be around (which in turn robs the authoritative status of such knowledge of any real epistemic interest). But I do not think that this is so. I think it plausible to maintain that it is in the *nature* of intentional properties in *cogito*-type cases to be graspable by only one subject. So, if such properties have the essential features of observable ones in these cases and thereby qualify as observable, they form a *special* kind of observable property. For it is in the nature of primary and secondary observable qualities of objects of perception that they be graspable by any number of subjects. This difference between intentional (and other mental) properties and (other) observable properties of objects makes the authoritative status of certain cases of self-knowledge a substantial matter.

applicable to cases of authoritative self-knowledge, despite the difference in authoritative status, because in both cases the knowledge is distinctively direct or immediate in nature.

So I believe that the central features characteristic of observation properties in the case of perception also apply to sensation and intentional ones in *cogito*-type cases. However, Shoemaker does not. His arguments present the most formidable challenge in current literature to observational accounts of self-knowledge. So let us examine them.

1. Shoemaker and the "Object Perception" Model.

In a series of influential articles, Sydney Shoemaker (1994) attacks the claim that introspective knowledge of one's states - both sensation and intentional - is a form of "inner sense" analogous to perception or observation. He does this in two stages. In the first he sets out a narrow model or stereotype of ordinary perception, the "object perception model", which he argues fails to fit introspective knowledge of one's sensation and intentional states, even minimally. In the second he considers a sub-class of theses constitutive of the object perception model, which he dubs the "broad perceptual model", whose two theses do not, he claims, apply to sensation and intentional states. Let us consider his claims with regard to the object perception model first.

Shoemaker characterizes the object perception model in terms of eight theses, four of which he considers to be essential to it. These theses are:

- (1) Sense perception involves the operation of an organ of perception whose disposition is to some extent under the voluntary control of the subject. Acquiring perceptual knowledge involves getting the appropriate organs into an appropriate relation to the object of perception.

(2) Sense perception involves the occurrence of sense-experiences, or sense-impressions, that are distinct from the object of perception, and also distinct from the perceptual belief (if any) that is formed. The occurrence of these constitutes the subject's being "appeared to" in some way - a way that may or may not correspond to the way the object actually is.

(3) While sense perception provides one with awareness of facts, i.e., awareness *that* so and so is the case, it does this by means of awareness of objects. One's awareness of the facts is explained by one's awareness of the objects involved in these facts. So, for example, I am aware (I perceive) that there is a book before me *by* perceiving the book - here the book is the (non-factual) object. In such a case there is always the potentiality of a factual awareness whose propositional content involves *demonstrative* reference to the object or objects of which one is perceptually aware - e.g., that *this* book is to the right of *that* one.

(4) Sense perception affords "identification information" about the object of perception. When one perceives one is able to pick out one object from others, distinguishing it from the others by information, provided by the perception, about both its relational and its nonrelational properties. The provision of such information is involved in the "tracking" of the object over time, and its reidentification from one time to another.

(5) The perception of objects standardly involves perception of their intrinsic, nonrelational properties. We can perceive relations between

things we perceive; but we wouldn't perceive these things at all, and so couldn't perceive relations between them, if they didn't present themselves as having intrinsic, nonrelational properties. To perceive that this book is to the right of that one I must perceive, or at least seem to perceive, intrinsic properties of the two books, e.g., their colours and shapes.

(6) Objects of perception are potential objects of attention. Without changing what one perceives, one can shift one's attention from one perceived object to another, thereby enhancing one's ability to gain information about it.

(7) Perceptual beliefs are causally produced by the objects or states of affairs perceived, via a causal mechanism that normally produces beliefs that are true. Given (2) above, this process involves the production of sense-experiences, which together with background beliefs give rise to the perceptual beliefs. Given (1), the specification of the causal mechanism makes reference to the organ of perception, and the reliability of the mechanism consists in there being a correspondence between the contents of the beliefs and what the sense-organs are directed towards.

(8) The objects and states of affairs which the perception is of, and which it provides knowledge about, exist independently of the perceiving of them, and, with certain exceptions, independently of there being things with the capacity for perceiving them or being aware of them. Thus trees, mountains, etc. can exist without there being creatures with the capacity to perceive them, and it is in principle

possible for houses, automobiles and human bodies to exist in this way. (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 252-4)

Shoemaker argues that introspective knowledge fails to conform to all eight of these theses. Since, however, he thinks that only four of them, 3 - 6, are essential to the model, and two of the others, 7 and 8, characterize the broad perceptual model to be discussed in section 2 below, I shall not dwell on his claims with regard to 1 and 2 except to make a couple of comments. First, in (1) Shoemaker summarily dismisses the suggestion that there might be an organ of "inner sense", but I do not see why we must take this view. Suppose that we did in fact discover that some region of the brain was strongly linked to awareness of sensations or occurrent thinkings, and perhaps had other similarities to outer sense organs (for instance, distortions due to manipulation of that region). Then might it not be tempting to think of it as an organ of inner sense? If so, then it seems that the possibility cannot be dismissed on *a priori* grounds: all that follows from Shoemaker's point is that we *do* not see any comparable organ to eyes and ears, and that is neither here nor there.

Suppose, on the other hand, that we were unable to discover any such organ of inner sense. Would this show that inner sense was not a form of perception? Not necessarily. For often in perception itself there is not a fixed use of a single organ. Suppose that I am listening to a quartet and I want to hear the viola separately from the other instruments. What I do is look at the viola player's left hand and pick up the speed of the vibrato, and suddenly her sound emerges from the overall blend. In this case ears and eyes are cooperating in a way I cannot separate, and it seems wrong to view such perception as the operation of a simple transducer.⁶ The point seems

⁶ In kinesthesia, one is sensorily aware of one's own bodily movements, but not through any fixed use of any organ that might plausibly be seen as a transducer akin to the eye or ear. In proprioception one's motor system has information about the mechanical state of play of one's limbs, which one uses in order to move one's body about, but again there is nothing akin to an organ that might be seen as a transducer for such information:

clearer still for kinesthesia and cases of proprioception, where there appears to be no transducer at all.⁷

Second, in (2) Shoemaker states that sense perception involves the occurrence of sense experiences by virtue of which perceived external objects appear to a subject, which are distinct both from objects perceived and from beliefs that those experiences ground. And he suggests, citing the views of Peacocke and Evans, that such experiences are at least partly non-conceptual. On this basis he rejects the view that sensations and intentional states might "appear to" subjects in some way. I find the assumption upon which this rejection is based problematic. There are models of perception, such as John McDowell's (1994), that explicitly reject such intermediaries, unconceptualized sense experiences, between objects of perception and beliefs to which those experiences give rise. For McDowell, there are objects of perception and thought, and there are the states to which those objects give rise. Sense experiences are, like states of belief and judgement, conceptualized. So it does not seem to be essential to all perceptual paradigms that there be a third item, an unconceptualized sensory experience that acts as intermediary.

Alternatively, I think it plausible to argue that, just as there are in sense perception states of "being appeared to" whose contents can be illusory and may not

The regular muscle fibers in a muscle responsible for producing force are called *extrafusal fibers*. Parallel to the extrafusal fibers are the *intrafusal fibers*, also called *muscle spindles*, which serve to measure muscle length and motion. Extrafusal fibers are innervated by *alpha motor neurons* in the spinal cord; intrafusal fibers are separately innervated by *gamma motor neurons*. They are sensory endings on the muscle spindles that send feedback about the length and motion of the spindles to the spinal cord over the *Ia afferent fibers*. The muscle spindles, joint receptors, and Golgi tendon organs are called *proprioceptors*, because they give information about the mechanical state of the limb. (Hollerbach, 1990, p. 176.)

⁷ I am indebted here to Andrew Woodfield and to Adam Morton, who provided the example.

be believed, so too, in reflective self-awareness there may be states of “being appeared” to whose contents can be illusory. When I am aware of an object, say, an apple, as round and red, I have an experience. On at least some accounts, this experience has various properties, some of which are qualia. The experience also has representational properties, of which at least some are conceptualised. So there is the apple that is red and round; there is the experience – which has a ‘what it is like’ aspect and presents the world as containing a round red apple in front of me; and then there is – or might be – the belief or judgement when I take that experience at face value and judge that there is a round red apple in front of me.

When I am aware of my own thinking, say that water is transparent, there is likewise a ‘what it is like’ aspect, but what is this an aspect of? Is it an aspect of the first-order thinking itself? What is the analogue of the experience (as of the round red apple) as distinct from the object (the round red apple)? Is there also some analogue of going forward in judgement?

I think it plausible to say that there is. When I am aware of my own thinking that water is transparent, that thought content presents itself to me *as* a thought content of a certain kind. It presents the world as if it were a certain way to me. Sometimes I might want to say that it seems as if I am thinking that water is transparent but perhaps something very strange is going on and I should not go forward in judgement. Then, on reflection, I might become convinced that there can be no error here, so I take the seeming at face value and go forward in judgement. But still the seeming and the judging are distinct. So, in both cases, there is the object (the apple, the first-order thinking), the seeming (the experience as of an apple, the seeming to be a thinking that water is transparent); and the judgement (“Here’s an apple’, ‘Here’s a thinking that water is transparent’).

This leaves us with theses 3 - 6. What are we to make of Shoemaker's claims with regard to these? My view is that, with regard to all four theses, what is true of perception is also true of certain cases of self-knowledge, and that what is not true of those cases of self-knowledge is not true of all cases of perception either. If this is

right, then Shoemaker's arguments against the claim that introspective self-knowledge is not a form of inner observation, in as much as they depend on the object perceptual model, do not succeed.

So let us examine thesis 3. Shoemaker claims that in perception one's awareness of facts is mediate or in some other way derivative on one's awareness of objects that constitute them. The implication is, "and not vice versa". But why should we think that this is true of perception? The thesis does not simply concern a fact/object dichotomy between perceiving objects, on the one hand, and perceiving facts, on the other. It concerns a much more complex and dubious distinction between priorities in perception; about whether, when we perceive, we perceive facts via perceiving objects or we perceive objects by perceiving facts. And here I do not see why we must be forced to choose: it may be that sometimes we do it one way and sometimes we do it another. A stronger point may be true here, namely that one cannot do one *without* doing the other, i.e., that perceiving an object *o* is, in fact, perceiving *o*'s being *F* (or *o*'s being *G*, or...)⁸ It also seems possible to perceive the *F*-ness of *o* without thereby perceiving *o*.⁹

What about thesis 4? Shoemaker thinks that 4 follows from 2, which I have already briefly commented upon above. However, let us examine more carefully his reasons for thinking that it is inapplicable to self-knowledge. Shoemaker's main reason for thinking that thesis 4 is inapplicable turns on the assumption that the object of such knowledge - of introspective awareness - is the *self*. In fact this assumption also pervades his discussion of theses 3, 5, and 6. His claim is that in perception, awareness of the object enters into awareness of a fact about that object by perceiving the object, its properties and relations to other things, and *identifying* the object *as* the object it is. In introspective self-knowledge, however, there is

⁸ Davidson makes a similar point in Davidson (1980)

⁹ See, for example, Locke's discussion of 'partial consideration' in Locke (1975). I am indebted here to an anonymous referee for this journal.

neither room for such identification nor need for information upon which to base such identification. There is no room for such identification because in general

...there is no possibility here of a *misidentification*; if I have my usual access to my hunger, there is no room for the thought "Someone is hungry all right, but is it me?" (Shoemaker 1994, p. 258).

And even when there is room for identification, it will always presuppose possession of other first-person information. Suppose, for example, that I am uncertain whether the person in the mirror is me, and I move about, trying to see whether the movements of this person match mine. In order to determine whether that person is me, I need to know that *I myself* am moving in certain ways. On pain of infinite regress, then, in general, identification-based introspective self-knowledge must presuppose self-knowledge that is not so based: a non-identification-based awareness of oneself.

Shoemaker recognizes that these claims, even if true, do not obviously rule out the possibility of a perception-based model of introspective self-knowledge which does not take the so-called 'object' of such knowledge to be a self. In particular, it does not rule out the possibility that the objects of introspective awareness are sensational and intentional *states*. However, he addresses these types of case also, and his main objection to the applicability of the perceptual paradigm here focuses, not on the infinite regress problem, but on the claim that there is no possibility of *misidentification*. Here his argument relies exclusively on the point that, unlike perception, knowledge of one's own intentional states (say, knowledge that one believes that Boris Yeltsin is President of Russia) is such that one *cannot misidentify* either the state (say, that it is a belief rather than a wish) or its content.

Now, I agree that, at least with respect to a small class of cases of self-knowledge (the *cogito*-type ones, in fact) one cannot go wrong in this way. But this is itself a controversial point that requires defense. Furthermore, what defense it needs

may be (and I think is) consistent with a perceptual model of self-knowledge. More importantly, however, I think it highly implausible to suppose that all mental states are incapable of misidentification in the way that Shoemaker suggests. On the contrary, even in the case of sensation states, where this might seem most clearly to be true, one needs to distinguish those immediate, fragmentary stabs of sensation and those longer term, complex, non-fragmentary states, such as having a migraine. The latter are not only complex, but seem to display a regular pattern of development which may, and often does, serve as a kind of 'check' on one's assessment of the state but also serves as a source of prediction. This makes such states like states of perception in having both causal and predictive elements.

In the case of intentional states the suggestion is much less plausible. Here one must distinguish one's currently, consciously entertained thoughts from beliefs which one has but hardly ever - if ever - entertains consciously. There are desires whose 'objects' may not be easily identified by the subject, and with regard to which a subject may be deluded. And there are assumptions at work in behaviour that may only be known indirectly and fallibly, if at all, by their subjects. In short, not all cases of sensation and intentional states are plausibly understood to be incapable of misidentification. Most such states appear, on the contrary, to be quite capable of misidentification: think, for example, of cases of memory where one misremembers. Like misperception, where one perceives but mistakes one thing for another, in misremembering one remembers but mistakes one thing for another. So, for example, in the case of memory of one's own sensation and intentional states, one might misremember an experience of anguish as one of embarrassment; or a perception of an Oxford college building as a perception of a church. Further, of those concerning which we might wish to claim that we are authoritative, it is controversial whether a subject's knowledge of them is either incorrigible or infallible. This is paralleled in perception. In some cases the relation between subject and object may be so simple, so immediate, that perhaps one cannot go wrong, or, if one can, one is nevertheless authoritative with regard to knowledge about them. This may be true, for example, for

cases of perception of secondary qualities such as colour. In other cases it is not like this.

So I do not think that Shoemaker's claims with regard to the possibility of misidentification establishes the required asymmetry between perception and self-knowledge. Before moving on, however, I should like to add one further point. Even if Shoemaker were right that we cannot misidentify first-person conscious thoughts, it would not without further argument follow that we cannot perceive first-person thoughts. For consider an analogous case: the actual world. Everybody agrees that we cannot misidentify the actual world with some other world. And notice that this point holds irrespective of whether we are modal realists or ersatzers of some sort. For if ersatzism of any sort is true, then there is only the actual world to perceive, and even if modal realism is true, then people at the actual world perceive only the actual world. But it is also true that we all agree that we perceive the actual world. The consequence is that we cannot misidentify the actual world, but we can perceive the actual world.¹⁰

Let us turn, then, to thesis 5. Shoemaker claims that it is an essential feature of the object perception model of ordinary perception that in perception one acquires information about the objects of perception by perceiving the *intrinsic, nonrelational* rather than *extrinsic* properties of the objects of perception. However, because intentional states are characterized by their contents, and intentional content is *extrinsic* rather than *intrinsic* to such states, thesis 4 is inapplicable to them. Thus, he argues,

...recent discussion of mental content seems to have established that a person's having a state with a certain content consists in part in "external" facts about the person's environment - in the person's standing, or having stood, in perceptual relations to external objects of

¹⁰ I am indebted here to Chris Daly.

certain kinds, in his belonging to a linguistic community in which certain practices exist, and so on. I have in mind the arguments of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. So having a state with a certain intentional content is not an intrinsic feature of a person, and having a certain content will not be an intrinsic feature of a belief or desire. (Shoemaker 1994, p. 259)

But I think that Shoemaker's argument here is problematic. It depends on an assumption concerning the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction that is dubious. Shoemaker seems to think that one cannot know one's intentional states in the perceptual way because such knowledge would either require knowledge of the extrinsic factors that determine intentional content to be what it is, or it would require the subject to "reach out into the world" in order to grasp the contents of one's states. Both requirements strike him as ones that inner sense could not meet. But I want to ask why the *extrinsic* nature of content-determination requires access to features outside the head. The assumption that seems to be lurking here is that a property is extrinsic if and only if it is *constituted* by relations to objects, etc., other than that or those that possess it in the sense of being its subject. But this strikes me as conflating *relational individuation* with *being a relation*. Think, for example, of colours. Perhaps it is true that they are such that their natures are not independent of their effects on normal perceivers in normal circumstances. Does it follow that colours are not *in* the objects of perception? Plainly not. In general, it does not follow from the fact that the individuation of an item requires reference to items to which it bears relations, that it is *constituted* in any way by those items. Consider, for instance, functional expressions, such as 'the son of x' which, when combined with a name, serve to map fathers on to their male offspring. The fact that these expressions individuate sons by their relations to their fathers in no way shows that sons are in some way *constituted* by their fathers. If this is so for items like colours and sons, there is no reason to think it is not so for others. Thus, it does not follow from the

fact that one may individuate a *property*, such as that of being a son, by means of an expression which relates that property to another, such as that of being a father, that being a son is in some way constituted by being a father. Similarly, it does not follow from the fact that intentional contents are relationally individuated that they are constituted by those beyond-the-head items that serve to help individuate them. Nor for that reason does it follow that intentional contents, when thought, are not 'wholly in the head'.

This leaves us with thesis 6. Shoemaker claims that in perception objects of awareness are ones to which one can not only *attend*, but that one is able to *shift* one's attention from one object to another, and that it is natural to suppose that the role of attention in introspective self-knowledge of one's own sensory states such as sensations might seem to be the same. However, he argues that the analogy with perception in fact breaks down, and that it is pretty much non-existent with regard to intentional states such as beliefs. Since my interest here is in the *cogito*-type cases of introspective self-knowledge, I shall put Shoemaker's claims concerning sensory states to one side. The question at issue, then, is why intentional states are not objects of attention.

Shoemaker's answer is that there really is no analogue here of *shifting* one's attention from one intentional state to another. If it makes sense to talk of shifting one's attention from one intentional state to another, it simply amounts to talk of one's shifting from thinking about one thought with a given content to thinking about another thought with a different content. But this is not the role that attention plays in perception, or even in sensation. Here the role played by attention is to put the subject in a better position to 'view' the object, or to get information about it.

But why is this not also true for certain cases of introspective self-knowledge? Most of the time we, as subjects of intentional states, are currently, consciously thinking thoughts about the world around us, even if we are not then reflecting upon them. One clear role that reflection plays is to enable us to attend to certain of these thoughts. Suppose that I am in the library, struggling to write a paper on authoritative

self-knowledge. I am troubled by a line of argument, and I am trying to figure out why I am dissatisfied with it. I ask myself, what exactly is my objection here, what exactly am I thinking? Here the role of attention seems just to be to put me in a better position to grasp the contents of my first-order thoughts. I do not see why such a role should be seen to be so foreign to introspective knowledge of one's intentional states, or why it is not genuinely information-seeking. Similarly for cases of memory.¹¹

If this is right, then all four of the theses that Shoemaker singles out as essential to the object perception model are problematic, either because they are not uncontroversially true of perception itself or because, although true of perception, they are also true for certain cases of introspective self-knowledge. It remains to consider theses 7 and 8, which together constitute what Shoemaker calls the "broad perceptual model".

¹¹ I am thinking here not only of cases of memory, where one can be said to 'redeploy' (Peacocke, 1996) contents of an earlier experience, but also of the kinds of cases mentioned by Moran (1994), where an intentional state is consciously present and one reflects upon it (as one does in wondering what one is presently thinking). Moran distinguishes between theoretical-descriptive and prescriptive bases for psychological ascriptions. He invites us to consider a person who, in the process of wondering about her current intentional states, asks herself the question 'What do I think about X?'. This question can be interpreted in two ways: (a) as a theoretical-cum-descriptive one about an attitude antecedently held, and (b) as a prescriptive one about what the subject *ought* to believe about X. Normally, these two ways of interpreting such a question interact with one another. However, Moran argues that they are distinct and that it may be possible to detach one from the other. His point is that reflective thinking is not always exclusively of the prescriptive form, where the question of rational interpretation, of having reasons by which to criticize, evaluate, and amend one's thoughts or beliefs, enters into the very process of first-order belief formation. There are descriptive elements in such reasoning, even where there are also prescriptive ones. Daydreaming may be a case of this kind. It is this descriptive element in reflective thinking that I wish to emphasize here.

2. The Broad Perceptual Model.

Shoemaker's characterization of the broad perceptual model identifies two claims as essential to it. These are:

7. Perceptual beliefs are causally produced by the objects or states of affairs perceived, via a causal mechanism that normally produces beliefs that are true. [Given (2) above,] this process involves the production of sense-experiences, which together with background beliefs give rise to the perceptual beliefs. [Given (1),] the specification of the causal mechanism makes reference to the organs of perception, and the reliability of the mechanism consists in there being a correspondence between the contents of the beliefs and what the sense-organs are directed towards.

8. The objects and states of affairs which the perception is of, and which it provides knowledge about, exist independently of the perceiving of them, and, with certain exceptions, independently of there being things with the capacity for perceiving them or being aware of them. Thus trees, mountains, etc. can exist without there being creatures with the capacity to perceive them, and it is in principle possible for houses, automobiles and human bodies to exist in this way. (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 253-4.)

Shoemaker dubs the conditions expressed in these claims the *causal condition* and the *independence condition*, respectively, and argues that neither condition is met in cases of introspective self-knowledge. Again, I think that to the extent that they are met in perception, they are also met in at least certain cases of self-knowledge; and that,

where they are not met in cases of self-knowledge, they fail to be met in certain cases of perception.

Those who wish to make use of the broad perceptual model to make intelligible cases of introspective self-knowledge must suppose that such cases are like perceptual beliefs about objects in at least this way: that just as our perceptions of objects in the environment are caused, via reliable perception-producing mechanisms, by those objects, our beliefs about our mental states are caused, via a reliable belief-producing mechanisms, by those states. Shoemaker claims that he does not hold this view. Instead of addressing it directly, however, he undermines it by arguing that the second, independence, condition cannot be met. His claim is that the relation between certain sorts of mental states (namely, sensations and propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires) and introspective awareness of them is *constitutive, or conceptual, and `self-intimating', or `self-presenting'* (but not in the Cartesian sense of being transparent to the subject).¹² This being so, the independence condition between first-order and second-order mental states in these cases cannot, as it can in the case of perception, be met.

¹² Thus, he says,

The view I support holds that there is a conceptual, constitutive, connection between the existence of certain sorts of mental entities and their introspective accessibility, while denying the transparency of the mental. It is a version of the view that certain mental facts are "self-intimating" or "self-presenting", but in a much weaker version than the transparency thesis. (Shoemaker, 1994, p. 272.)

Shoemaker associates transparency with Cartesianism, whose model of self-knowledge he interprets as a kind of 'inner eye' model of introspection, whereby one's own first-order mental states serve as objects of inner perception. Such objects are evidently 'open to view' in a way that is incorrigible and/or infallible. Shoemaker's own view is that although one cannot in general misidentify one's own sensations and intentional states, it is not because they are inner objects to which one bears some special epistemic relation akin to a perceptual one. See Shoemaker, 1994, pp. 271-2.

Let us concentrate, then, on Shoemaker's argument for thinking that the independence condition cannot be satisfied in the case of introspective self-knowledge, since it is this that undermines both of the theses constitutive of the broad perceptual model.

Shoemaker's case turns on a kind of thought experiment that he calls "self-blindness", a condition rather like "blindsight". In blindsight a person is blind to certain facts about her mental states that she would be aware of if she were functioning normally. So, for example, a person might insist that she cannot see something that is present in her visual field, but when she is forced to 'guess', she will get it right far more often than chance could explain. Shoemaker invites us to consider a person who, like the blindsighted one, is blind to certain facts about her mental states which she would be aware of if she were functioning normally, but on another level. Here her own first-order mental states are present, but she is functioning abnormally introspectively rather than perceptually. Whereas the blindsighted person sees things that she is unaware of seeing and so is having perceptual experiences of which she is introspectively unaware, in self-blindness a person is in mental states that she is undergoing but to which she is introspectively blind.

Crucial to the case of self-blindness is the possibility that the subject should be able to *conceive* of those facts or phenomena to which she is blind, so that she is capable of learning of those facts or phenomena by means other than perception or introspection. What matters is that she is incapable of learning about them *perceptually*, through her perceptual experiences, in the visual case, and *introspectively*, through her awareness of her first-order mental states, in the case of self-knowledge. Self-blindness is in this respect analogous to blindness, where the subject is otherwise cognitively normal, and so able to conceive of those states of affairs that she is unable to learn about visually.

Shoemaker claims that from an evolutionary point of view, this is not a real possibility. However, the independence condition suggests that self-blindness should be at least logically possible, just as in perception blindsight is possible. Of course,

this is compatible with the presence, in general, of a reliable connection between being in certain mental states and being introspectively aware of them, just as there is in perception. But it suggests that this connection is *contingent*. And Shoemaker argues that in the case of self-knowledge it is not.

Shoemaker's argument is that self-blindness with regard to one's own intentional states is impossible. I think that he is right about this, but for the wrong reason. I also think that his being right about this does not show that the self-knowledge is not quasi-perceptual. My reason is that the relevant analogy between perception and self-knowledge on which the quasi-perceptual model depends is not one between *objects* of perception (such as apples) and intentional *states*, but between observable *properties* of objects (such as the redness of an apple) and contentful *properties* of intentional states. And although the independence condition is not met in the case of contentful properties and the capacity to be reflected upon, neither is it met in the case of observable properties such as the property, *red*, and the capacity to be observed. So although the broad perceptual model is inapplicable to the case of self-knowledge, it is also inapplicable to the case of perception of observable properties of objects.

Why is Shoemaker right to think that the independence condition is not met in the case of self-knowledge, but for the wrong reason? His reason for thinking that the independence condition is not met in the case of introspective self-knowledge is that, in being in first-order states such as belief, and in having normal intelligence, conceptual capacity, and rationality, one *automatically* has second-order beliefs:

...if one has an available first-order belief, *and* has a certain degree of rationality, intelligence and conceptual capacity (here including having the concept of belief and the concept of oneself), then automatically

one has the corresponding second-order belief. (Shoemaker 1994, p. 288)¹³

A rational agent, that is to say, an agent who has normal intelligence, rationality, and conceptual capacity, will behave in ways that give the best possible evidence that she is self-aware, and so not self-blind. Such a person will be self-aware in that she has *normal awareness* of her own intentional states, where this sometimes involves, but *does not require*, reasoning sequentially from one premise to another by a series of steps.

...in order to explain the behaviour we take as showing that people have certain higher order beliefs, beliefs about their first-order beliefs, we do not need to attribute to them anything beyond what is needed in order to give them first order beliefs plus normal intelligence, rationality, and conceptual capacity. ...in supposing that a creature is rational, what one is supposing is that it is such that its being in certain states tends to result in effects, behaviour or other internal states, that are rationalized by those states. Sometimes this requires actually going through a process of reasoning in which one gets from one proposition to another by a series of steps, and where special reasoning skills are

¹³ This quotation (and others to follow) suggests a view that is ambiguous between two claims. The first is that first-order intentional states are not an agent's *reasons for* (but only causes of) her second-order states. The second is that first-order intentional states cannot in general exist independently of (and so are not merely contingently related to) second-order ones. Shoemaker's view is in fact a combination of the two: an endorsement of (causal-role) functionalism as a theory of the nature of mental states, and (consequently) a rejection of a reason-based account of self-knowledge. What follows in the text is an argument, first, for the claim that first-order intentional states can be reasons for second-order ones, and second, for the claim that this does not prohibit certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the *cogito*-type cases, from meeting the independence condition.

involved. But usually it does not require this. I see an apple and I reach for it. It is rational for me to do so, and this can be shown by presenting an argument, a bit of practical reasoning that is available to me, in terms of my desires and my beliefs about the nutritional and other properties of apples. But I needn't actually go through any process of sequential reasoning in order for the beliefs and desires in question to explain and make rational my reaching for the apple. And no more does the rational agent need to go through a process of sequential reasoning in order for her first order belief that P, plus her other first order beliefs and desires, to explain and rationalize the behaviour that manifests the second order belief that she believes that P. (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 284-5)

As this passage makes clear, a subject's being self-aware requires no more than being in states of belief and desire that tend to cause and rationalize other intentional states and behaviour. That is to say, self-awareness requires being in first-order states that are apt to cause rationalizing behaviour.

But what kind of self-awareness is this? Shoemaker's self-aware person is one whose beliefs and desires rationalize her behaviour, but not necessarily from her own perspective. Her second-order beliefs simply 'come for free': they will automatically be present given the presence of an appropriate system of first-order beliefs.¹⁴ It is true that she is typically *capable* of reasoning sequentially and so of rationalizing her behaviour from her own point of view, but such reasoning, and rationalizing is not required for self-awareness. (Nor, it seems, is the capacity to engage in such reasoning required for self-awareness.) So self-awareness is something that subjects can possess, not by virtue of exercising a first-person perspective on their own states, nor

¹⁴ I owe this way of putting the point to an anonymous referee for this journal.

even by virtue of having the capacity to engage in first-personal reasoning, but simply by behaving in a rational way, i.e., in a way which can be rationalized.

But then I think that Shoemaker's use of the term '*self-aware*' to mean '*introspectively self-aware*' here is a misnomer: subjects whose rationalizing behaviour does not require the capacity to engage in such first-personal reasoning (as from their own perspective) do *not* provide the best possible evidence for being introspectively aware of their own beliefs and desires. Conscious, yes, but introspectively conscious, no. Further, any conception of self-awareness stronger than this, say, in requiring the capacity for sequential reasoning, would require the capacity to reflect on one's reasons *as reasons*, and so require a more robust account of introspective self-knowledge than Shoemaker is prepared to give.

So even if Shoemaker is right in his claim that one's ability to be in first-order intentional states is not independent of the capacity to be self-aware in the minimal sense of being capable of acting in ways that are rational, i.e., can be rationalized, it would not follow that one cannot be in first-order intentional states independently of the capacity to be self-aware in the much stronger sense associated with the ability to subject one's first-order states to critical reflective reasoning *as reasons*.¹⁵

¹⁵ Further, it does not seem impossible that there should be creatures that are *sometimes, or occasionally* self-blind in the stronger sense of failing to be introspectively self-aware and yet are rational in the sense that their behaviour might be capable of being rationalized from their own perspectives, since they might be capable of finding out in ways other than by introspective self-awareness that they are in first-order states of a given kind. Consider, for example, simple cases of self-deception. Suppose that I am in love with someone and I go out of my way to ignore and avoid him. Being self-deceived, I cannot be brought to see that I am in love with him by any act of '*inner awareness*'. But others, seeing easily enough that my behaviour is the behaviour of one who is in love, might be capable of getting me to see this in other ways. Similarly for repressed mental states. A woman may know that her husband is having an affair but be unable to confront the reality of the situation. She goes about her daily business giving no behavioural signs of her knowledge. But others, in whose presence she has been exposed to evidence which incriminates her husband, and who discern alterations in her behaviour, such as 'going off' a favourite restaurant in an area in which her husband has been seen with his lover, might be capable of getting her to acknowledge her state. Of course, that this can sometimes be the case is compatible with Shoemaker's claim that in general such self-blindness is impossible, consistently with the assumption of normal rationality.

Shoemaker's argument here is effectively that one's first-order states do not in general provide *reasons* for one's having second-order beliefs. As he puts it,

...believing that one believes that P can be just believing that P plus having a certain level of rationality, intelligence and so on... (Shoemaker 1994, p. 289)

This view, which Peacocke (1996) calls the 'no reasons' view, is often contrasted with a view of self-knowledge which takes such knowledge to be based on a kind of inner observation. Shoemaker's argument is that self-blindness in the case of intentional states is impossible because self-knowledge of one's own intentional states *is not based on reasons of any kind*. Such knowledge is *baseless*.

But I want to ask why we should think that all cases of self-knowledge are of this kind, and so why being rational does not require the capacity to be self-aware in a stronger sense than this. And I think that Shoemaker's reasons for thinking that it does not turn out, on examination, to trade on an ambiguity in the term 'rationality' and its near cousin, 'self-aware'.

It has been said that it is essential to belief possession, and to the concept of belief, that beliefs are subject to rationalistic constraints. Thus to have a belief that *p*, for some propositional content *p*, is (amongst other things) to be disposed to assert that *p*, to engage in reasonings using the content that *p*, and to be prepared to revise the belief that *p* in the light of conflicting evidence.

In one, very minimal, sense of the term 'self-aware', to be self-aware is simply to employ one's beliefs in rational behaviour, to have one's first-order beliefs cause one's other intentional states and behaviour in ways that can be rationalized (Davidson 1970, 1974, McGinn 1982, Shoemaker 1988, 1991). It is in this sense that one can attribute to children, who may not yet be capable of critically evaluating their reasonings to see whether, for example, they conform to *modus ponens*, self-

awareness of their own states. It seems clear that this is the sense of self-awareness that Shoemaker has in mind when he claims that a subject who is self-aware is rational. Suppose that he is right in thinking that neither actually engaging in a process of sequential reasoning by which subjects rationalize their own behaviour nor even having the capacity to so engage is required for rationality and self-awareness in this sense.

Still, it may be that one can only be capable of engaging in *reflective reasoning*, *reasoning about one's reasoning*, if one is capable of thinking certain kinds of thoughts, thoughts of the form, *I am thinking that I am thinking that p*, and so of being self-aware in a much stronger sense than Shoemaker is prepared to countenance. The reason is that in order to reason reflectively, one needs to be able to *examine* one's reasons, and to consider them *as reasons*, for behaving one way or another, or for accepting or rejecting or revising one's attitudes. To do this evidently requires being able to view them *as objects* of reflection or deliberation. As Tyler Burge puts the point,

To be capable of critical reasoning, and to be subject to certain rational norms necessarily associated with such reasoning, some mental acts and states must be *knowledgeably* reviewable. (Burge 1996, p. 8)

Critical reasoning is reasoning that involves an ability to recognize and effectively employ reasonable criticism or support for reasons and reasoning. It is reasoning guided by an appreciation, use, and assessment of reasons and reasoning as such. (Burge 1996, p. 8)

Burge considers it to be essential to the ability to reason critically that one be capable of thinking *cogito*-type thoughts, and he associates this ability with being rational in some sense of 'rational'. This sense of 'rational' is clearly stronger than what

Shoemaker has in mind. And I think that being rational in Shoemaker's sense requires being rational in this stronger sense.

It may be that one can be rational in Shoemaker's sense without actually engaging in critical reasoning. But it does not seem possible for one to be rational without being *capable* of reasoning critically. Nor does Shoemaker actually claim that it does. But if so, then one cannot be rational in Shoemaker's sense without being rational in the stronger sense associated with the ability to reason critically (as Burge construes it). Since this latter ability requires the ability to think *cogito*-type thoughts, thoughts about what one is currently consciously thinking, where one is both thinking and thinking *about* a propositional content, the ability to be rational in Shoemaker's sense requires the ability to think *cogito*-type thoughts, and not all self-knowledge can be construed in the way Shoemaker construes it.

Shoemaker in fact recognizes this, but points out that his conception is the one that is in fact met by most people most of the time, and the notion of rationality that involves engaging in critical reasoning, is an ideal that most of us regularly fail to meet (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 286-7). But my point here is that the *capacity* to engage in critical reasoning, not the exercising of it, is constitutive of rationality, and that that capacity requires the ability to think *cogito*-type thoughts. So even if Shoemaker has shown that the independence condition is not met in certain cases of self-knowledge, ones where one is rational in the weaker sense, he has not shown that this is true for all such cases. Specifically, he has not shown that it is not met in the case of *cogito*-type thoughts. The question, then, is whether *cogito*-type thoughts themselves 'come for free': whether they too fail to meet the independence condition.

Here I think Shoemaker is right. For what I have effectively argued is this.

1. Shoemaker's conception of 'rational' is too weak to underpin introspective self-knowledge (i.e., strong rationality is necessary for introspective self-knowledge).

2. A stronger conception of 'rational' (such as Burge's) is sufficient to underpin introspective self-knowledge, but to be rational in this stronger sense requires the capacity to think *cogito*-type thoughts (i.e., the capacity to have *cogito*-type thoughts is necessary for strong rationality).

3. Therefore, the capacity to have *cogito*-type thoughts is necessary for introspective self-knowledge.

It is consistent with this that one can be in first-order intentional states without actually having *cogito*-type thoughts. Thus it is possible for a subject to have a belief without having a belief about a belief. But I have argued that one cannot be in first-order intentional states independently of the capacity to be strongly rational, and so the capacity to have *cogito*-type thoughts. And if having first order thoughts entails being weakly rational, then since being weakly rational entails the capacity to be strongly rational, it is not possible for a subject to have a belief without having the capacity to have a belief about a belief.

Evidently, then, the independence condition cannot be met by first-order and *cogito*-type thoughts. For the independence condition concerns, not merely the distinctness of objects of perception from perceivers, so that the actual existence of the one is independent of the actual existence of the other, but the distinctness of objects of perception from the very capacity to be perceived, so that the existence of such objects is independent of that very *capacity*. Applied to the case of introspective self-knowledge, the independence condition requires not merely that the existence of first-order thoughts is independent of the existence of *cogito*-type thoughts, but that the existence of first-order thoughts is independent of the *capacity* to have *cogito*-type thoughts. And I have argued that the existence of first-order thoughts is *not* independent of the capacity to have *cogito*-type thoughts.

So Shoemaker is right, if the claim that mind-blindness is impossible is understood as the claim that it is impossible for first-order states of subjects to exist

independently of the capacity to have *cogito*-type thoughts. But I do not think that this establish what Shoemaker thinks it does with regard to the perceptual model. He supposes that the applicability of the broad perceptual model to introspective self-knowledge would require supposing that, just as objects of perception can exist independently of the existence of perceivers and even of the existence of beings with the *capacity* to perceive, first-order intentional states can exist independently of the existence of second-order (or *cogito*-type) states, and even of the existence of beings with the capacity to have such states. And since he thinks that the latter is not possible, the analogy fails to hold.

But the appropriate analogy, and the one on which this paper has focussed throughout, is not that between objects of perception and the capacity to perceive, on the one hand, and intentional states and the capacity to be reflected on, on the other. The appropriate analogy is with observable properties of objects, such as the property, *red*, of an apple, and contentful properties of first-order intentional states, such as the property, *thinks that water is transparent*. The claim was that in certain conditions (normal conditions for perception, normal perceivers, and so on, for the case of observable properties of objects, and normal conditions for reflection, namely, being in current conscious states, normal thinkers, and so on, for the case of contentful properties of first-order intentional states), introspective self-knowledge is like observation in being epistemically direct. And it is, if what is being compared is observable properties of objects with contentful properties of first-order intentional states. For it is no more possible for observable properties to exist independently of the capacity for being observed than it is for contentful properties of first-order intentional states to exist independently of the capacity to be reflected upon.

The analogy with observable properties of objects and contentful properties of first-order intentional states is apt. For it is the properties of such objects, and not the objects themselves, which are appropriately characterized in terms of the features of direct epistemic access (that they are epistemically basic, and that they are as they appear to normal subjects in normal circumstances). This is paralleled in the case of

first-order intentional states. It is the properties of such states, and not the states themselves, which are appropriately characterized in terms of the features of direct epistemic access. Suppose, for example that token physicalism is true, and each mental state is (identical with) a physical state. Then it is not obviously true that such physical states cannot exist independently of the capacity to be reflected upon.

What this shows, I think, is that even the broad perceptual model is too crude a model by which to characterize perception. For there are cases which count as cases of perception which do not meet the independence condition, namely perception of observable properties of objects. And if that condition can fail to be met in cases of perception, then the fact that cases of self-knowledge also fail to meet it cannot be a reason for thinking that these are not cases of quasi-perception.

This opens up conceptual space for an account of introspective self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, the *cogito*-type ones, which is broadly perceptual (more broadly, in fact, than Shoemaker's broad perceptual model). This should be of interest to anyone whose concern with self-knowledge is, as mine is, a concern with *authoritative* self-knowledge. The *cogito*-type cases are central, not peripheral, to the issues here precisely because they count as paradigmatic ones of authoritative self-knowledge. And a perceptual model is of use in helping to make intelligible these cases of self-knowledge precisely because it promises to deliver an explanation of the special epistemic right, or entitlement, that subjects have with regard to knowledge of certain of their own intentional states in just these cases.

3. Conclusion

I have argued that Shoemaker's argument for the claim that the independence condition cannot be met in self-knowledge is not decisive against the view that introspective self-knowledge is quasi-perceptual. Shoemaker's case against the applicability of the broad perceptual model to introspective self-knowledge thus fails to establish that self-knowledge is not a form of inner observation for the same reason

as it fails with respect to the object perception model. That he takes theses 3 - 6 to be constitutive of the object perception model is problematic because it neglects models of perception in which at least some of these conditions fail to apply. But this is not the only reason why his attack on the thesis that introspective self-knowledge is a form of inner perception fails to succeed. It is unsuccessful also because it neglects arguably the most important and central cases of self-knowledge, ones where subjects have a special epistemic entitlement or right to such knowledge, namely the *cogito*-type cases.¹⁶

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Notes